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DECLARATORY RELIEF IN TUCKER ACT
SUITS: A BROADENING OF THE MONEY-
JUDGMENT JURISDICTION CONCEPT
Until recently the Court of Claims took a restricted view of
the interrelationship of the Declaratory Judgment Act and its
jurisdiction under the Tucker A ct. Then in King v. United States
these selfimposed jurisdictional limitations were disavowed, and
Jbr the first time the United States government was required to
dejend a declaratory judgment action relying solely on the
Tucker Act to establish jurisdiction. The rationale in King, as
this note interprets it, raises broad questions touching the
continued viability of the sovereign immunity concept as well as
more particularized procedural problems Jbr plaintifjf who seek
the newly available declaratory relief
r N THE thirty-four years since the enactment of the Declaratory
Judgment Act,' federal courts have utilized this procedural
remedy in an expanding number of areas, including actions against
the federal government under the Suits in Admiralty Act,2 the
Federal Tort Claims Act,3 and other special jurisdictional statutes.
However, until the recent case of King v. United States,' declara-
tory relief against the United States government in the Court
Ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955 (1934) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-03 (1964):
"2201. Creation of remedy.
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to federal taxes, any
court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and
other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further
relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final
judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.
"2202. Further relief.
Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted,
after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse party whose rights have been
determined by such judgment."
246 U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (1964).
328 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1964).
See note 47 infra.
5 390 F.2d 894 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
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of Claims has been unavailable in litigation under its general
jurisdictional statute, the Tucker Act.6 Heretofore, the Court of
Claims has viewed its jurisdiction as limited to suits for money
judgments on the technical ground that the Tucker Act contained
no procedures for enforcement of non-money judgments. In King the
Court of Claims, departing from established precedent, has now
stated its willingness to entertain suits for declaratory judgment so
long as it will enable the claimant, if he prevails, to recover money
from the United States either administratively or in a later suit.
Prior to and following retirement from the Army in 1959, Colonel
King attempted to convince various military boards that he should
have been retired for reasons of physical disability and, thus, entitled
to tax-free disability pay, rather than taxable retirement pay.7
Unsuccessful on the administrative level, King brought suit in the
Court of Claims under the Tucker Act seeking a money judgment
against the federal government for an amount equivalent to the
income tax deducted from his longevity retirement pay.' Without
going to the merits of the assertion that the Under-Secretary of the
Army had acted arbitrarily, the government argued that the suit was
essentially one for a tax refund and, therefore, barred by the plaintiff's
failure to file a timely refund claim. 9 Following a court order
6 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 & 1491 (1964).
'Although disability and retirement pay are equal in amount, the latter is taxed whereas the
former is not. King was retired in 1959 for length of service pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 3911, and
his retirement pay was based on 10 U.S.C. § 3991, Formula A. This entitled him to 75 percent
of his monthly base pay as a colonel minus an amount withheld for income tax purposes. King
contended that he should have been retired for disability pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1401,
Formula 1. If INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 104(a)(4), which excludes from gross income
"allowance[s] for personal injuries or sickness resulting from active service in the armed forces
," were found to apply to such compensation, Colonel King's future pay checks would be
increased by the amount withheld for federal taxes. He might even be able td obtain
administratively from the Army the funds withheld from his past pay.
I Disputes over disability retirement ratings and the actions of military review and correction
boards are a common-place occurrence in the Court of Claims. See, e.g., Hutter v. United
States, 345 F.2d 828 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Merriott v. United States, 163 Ct. Cl. 261 (1963), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 838 (1964); Friedman v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 364 (Ct. Cl. 1958); Capps
v. United States, 137 F. Supp. 721 (Ct. Cl. 1956); Lemly v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 248 (Ct.
Cl. 1948).
9 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (1964) requires the filing of a timely refund claim as a prerequisite to a
suit to recover taxes paid. A timely refund claim is one filed within three years of plaintiffs
return or two years from plaintiff's payment of taxes. 26 U.S.C. § 6511 (a) (1964). Apparently,
the court reasoned that King was requesting, in effect, a return of the money withheld as tax and
that this amounted to a tax refund claim. King argued that he was not requesting a refund but,
rather, disability pay which he had not received. In a sense, it might be said that King was
contending he had received class A pay when he was entitled to class B pay. But this overlooked
the fact that the pay rates for both classes are identical. Apparently, the court did not consider
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upholding this defense, King and the Committee of American
Steamship Lines as amicus curiae'0 joined issue with the government
on whether the Court of Claims had the authority to give a
declaration of plaintiff's right to have his military records corrected."
Acknowledging that the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act'2
was not to expand a court's jurisdiction, the court noted that
declaratory relief would not necessarily expand the classes of claims
or issues within its jurisdiction. For this reason the Court concluded
the label of the pay relevant so long as the rates were the same. Had the rates been unequal, the
result might have been different, because then a mere refund could not have settled the issue.
,0 Under the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C. § 1101 (1964), United States flag lines
and shipyards are subsidized by the federal government. As the U.S. flag lines must employ
American seamen, they are paid an operating-differential subsidy designed to equalize their
wage costs with those of their principal foreign competitors. The Act uses contracts between the
United States and the ship operators as its basic operating instrument. A substantial proportion
of the disputes which inevitably arise out of this maze of regulation and control relate to the
obligations of the operator or of the United States under these subsidy contracts. It has been
held that such disputes are subject to review only in the Court of Claims. See American
President Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Bd., 133 F. Supp. 100 (D.D.C. 1955), affd, 235 F.2d
18 (D.C. Cir. 1956). Under the payment procedures, a "final accounting" takes place at the end
of each year. Such accountings can involve delays of prodigious proportions, sometimes three to
four years. Many of these disputes involve very large amounts of money, the uncertainty of
which adversely affects the financial planning of the lines. Heretofore, subsidized lines have been
required to have a matured claim for a money judgment in order to institute proceedings in the
Court of Claims. This, in turn, meant that no action could be taken until the completion of the
annual final accounting. Thus, years might elapse before many controversies under the operating-
differential subsidy contract could be brought to the Court of Claims for resolution. Because the
availability of declaratory relief might enable subsidized operators to bring action prior to the
completion of these annual final accountings, the Committee of American Steamship Lines
appeared as amicus curiae.
11 While the Court of Claims had never, theretofore, granted declaratory relief, federal district
courts had on numerous occasions entertained suits for the declaration of a serviceman's right to
have his military records changed. See, e.g., Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958) (action
against public official for declaration that plaintiff was entitled to an "honorable" discharge
from the armed services); Van Bourg v. Nitze, 388 F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (same); Ashe v.
McNamara, 355 F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965) (action against Secretary of the Air Force for
declaration that officer was entitled to be raised on permanent retired list rather than being
discharged); Ogden v. Zuckert, 298 F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965) (same); Bland v. Connally, 293 F.2d
852 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (action for honorable discharge). However, these declaratory judgment
actions were not brought under the Tucker Act but, rather, under the jurisdictional grants of 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331(a), 1361 (1964) and within the venue limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1964).
In addition, these actions were not brought against the federal government but, rather, against
public officials on the theory that they had exceeded their statutory powers. Nevertheless, the
subject matter of the claims was similar to that in King in that they involved requests for
corrections in military records.
12 A graphic description of the benefits to be derived from declaratory relief was given by
Congressman Gilbert when he remarked: "Under the present law you take a step in the dark ano
then turn on the light to see if you stepped into a hole. Under the declaratory law you turn on the
light and then take the step." 69 CONG. REC. 2030 (1928).
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that, in view of the clear language including the Court of Claims
within the Act'3 and the silence of legislative history on the issue, the
original Act of 1934 should be read "as adequately authorizing the
court to render declaratory judgments,"'" and, alternatively, that the
1948 revision should be accepted as correct.'"
DECLARATORY RELIEF DENIED
While the doctrine that the United States is immune to suit
without its consent 6 has been a source of continuing judicial
obfuscation as to when a suit is and is not against the federal
"The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964) applies to "any court of the
United States," which is defined in 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1964) as including the Court of Claims. It
is apparent, therefore, that the act on its face applies to the Court of Claims.
,4390 F.2d at 913.
" See notes 73 & 74 infra and accompanying text.
6 The doctrine of sovereign immunity, simply stated, is that the United States cannot be sued
without its express consent. While the idea is old and its origin uncertain, Bodin, Hobbes and
Machiavelli are probably the fathers of the concept that sovereignty is absolute and above the
law, that the sovereign creates the law and as creator cannot be bound by the law. Thus, in
England arose the maxim that "the King can do no wrong," and from this personal immunity of
a single individual arose the whole concept of sovereignty. Nevertheless, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity was not expressly incorporated into the United States Constitution, nor is
there anything in the Constitution that compels such a doctrine. But see Monaco v. Mississippi,
292 U.S. 313, 321 (1934). While an early Supreme Court decision rejected the concept of state
governmental immunity, see Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 419 (1793), the effect of the
decision was largely nullified by the passage of the eleventh amendment prohibiting suit against
a state in a federal court by citizens of another state or country. Later, in Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821), the Court stated: "The universally received opinion is, that
no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against the United States .. " But the Supreme
Court has squarely rejected that this was an outgrowth of the maxim "the King can do no wrong."
See Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341 (1879). And in 1882, Justice Miller observed that
"the principal [of sovereign immunity] has never been discussed or the reasons for it given, but it
has always been treated as established doctrine." United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207
(1882).
Only two justifications have ever been given by the courts for the doctrine. In Gibbons v.
United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269, 275 (1868), it was said to be a "policy imposed by
necessity." This view has been shown to be fallacious in that practically every country of
Western Europe has long accepted financial responsibility, with no apparent loss of efficient or
effective governmental service. See Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. I, 2,
9 n.25, 14 n.45 (1924). The other justification is that "there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends." Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205
U.S. 349, 353 (1907). The prevailing American philosophy, however, is that the people and not
the state are supreme. See Comment, A Definition and Explanation oj the Sovereignty in the
Polity of the United States, 3 HoUsToN L. REV. 368 (1966). Today, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity rests primarily on the policy of non-interference with government activities. See Land
v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947). See generally Borchard, Governmental Responsibility it
Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 757 (1927); Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign
Immunity, 13 LA. L. REV. 476 (1953).
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government,'7 Congress has on a number of occasions expressly
"1 Because the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies only to suits against the United States,
litigants have sought to avoid its application by attempting to secure relief against government
officials, rather than naming the United States as defendant. Support for this strategy was found
in the Supreme Court holding that only when the sovereign was a record party defendant would
the jurisdictional bar of its immunity be invoked. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). This test, however, was abandoned four years later when it became
apparent in a suit against an official that the judgment would actually operate against the
government. See Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 110 (1828). Thereafter,
courts have stressed the effect of the relief sought in determining whether a suit, though
nominally against a federal official, is in fact against the United States. Thus, jurisdiction has
been denied when the net effect of the judgment would be (1) to compel performance of a
contract as against the Government, see Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 278 F.2d
912 (2d Cir. 1960); (2) to compel the Government to part with property the title to which is
admittedly in the Government, see Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57 (1963); and (3) to collect
money from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, see Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union v.
Gronouski, 350 F.2d 451, 455 (1965). See generally Note, 65 HARV. L. REV. 466 (1952); Block,
Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARV. L. REV.
1060 (1946).
In addition, an official cannot be held personally liable if his action is authorized. See Cary v.
Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845). If, however, an officer's actions are without statutory or
constitutional authority, an action against him usually will not be barred by sovereign immunity
unless an issue within any of the above three groups is also involved. See Larson v. Domestic &
Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949) (action seeking specific performance of contract
requiring conveyance of government property); Note, 65 HARV. L. REv. 466, 469-70 (1952).
This test, based on a theory of agency, implies that when a government official acts outside the
scope of his constitutional or statutory authority, his action is taken in an individual rather than
an official capacity and is enjoinable as such. Compare Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962)
(action of ejectment against official held to be against Government in absence of claim the
defendant exceeded his authority) with Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123 (1951) (official's act treated as unauthorized since it was alleged to be purely arbitrary). See
generally Rabinowitz v. Kennedy, 376 U.S. 605 (1964) (suit for a declaratory judgment); Udall
v. Littell, 338 F.2d 537 (D.C. Cir. 1964), 366 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1007 (1967); Note, Sovereign Immunity and Specific Relief Against Federal Oficers, 55
COLUM. L. REv. 73 (1955).
Because the revenue officials were apparently acting within their statutory authority, King
could not expect to avoid the defense of sovereign immunity by instituting action against them
personally. It is also doubtful that King could have succeeded by bringing action against the
Under-Secretary of the Army for relief in the nature of mandamus, which will lie only when a
statute leaves the officer with no choice of action. Had an action in the nature of mandamus been
available, suit could have been brought in district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964), a new
provision granting mandamus jurisdiction to all district courts. For details see D. SCHWARTZ &
S. JACOBY, GOVERNMENT LITIGATION-CASES AND NOTES 581-89 (1963); Jacoby, The Effect of
Recent Changes in the Law of"Nonstatutory" Judicial Review, 53 GEo. L.J. 19 (1964).
The Under-Secretary possesses considerable discretion in determining an officers' physical
fitness since medical judgments are to some extent inherently arbitrary. Offering some
guidelines, 10 U.S.C. § 1204 (1964) provides that the Secretary's decision is to determine that,
"(1) based upon accepted medical principles, the disability is of a permanent nature; (2) the
disability is the proximate result of performing active duty or inactive-duty training; (3) the
disability is not the result of the member's intentional misconduct or willful neglect, and was not
incurred during a period of unauthorized absence .. " However, the Secretary's decision is
considered to be one of fact and the only basis for an injunction would be that he has acted
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waived sovereign immunity by legislative fiat. 8 The initial step was
taken in 1855 with the creation of the Court of Claims 9 to hear suits
against the United States founded upon any act of Congress, any
regulation of the Executive Department, or any express or implied
contract with the United States, and to make periodic reports of its
findings to Congress.2" Under the Act of 1863, the court was given the
power to render final judgments on these claims.2' Finally, in 1887 the
Tucker Act, 22 while incorporating these features from the previous
two Acts, extended the court's jurisdiction to claims founded upon the
United States Constitution and to claims for liquidated or
unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort,23 and granted the
district and circuit courts limited concurrent jurisdiction for claims
arbitrarily. Since this is what King alleged in his suit against the United States, it seems that he
might have avoided problems by seeking an injunction or a declaratory judgment against the
Under-Secretalry based on a claim that he had acted arbitrarily and thus beyond his fact-finding
statutory authority. Apparently, this route was not taken because of King's desire for a refund.
See cases cited in note I I supra and Chambers v. Robertson, 183 F.2d 144 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
rev'd -on other grounds, 341 U.S. 37 (1951) (statutory language of what constitues "service
records" found to be clear and unambiguous). See generally Developments in the
Law-Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 HARV. L. REV. 827, 831-64
(1957).
"See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 & 1491 (1964) (Tucker Act); id. §§ 1346(b), 1402(b), 1504, 2110,
2410(b), 2411 (b), 2412(c), & 2671-80 (tort claims); id. § 1347 (partition where U.S. is a tenant);
id. §§ 1353 & 1505 (Indian claims); id. §§ 1495 & 2513 (damages for erroneous conviction); Id.
§ 1498 (patent infringement); id. § 1499 (government contractor's action for liquidated
damages); 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52 & 781-90 (1964).
" For a detailed history of the Court of Claims see Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962);
Pocono Pines Assembly Hotels Co. v. United States, 73 Ct. Ci. 447, 466-92, motion tofilefor
writ of mandamus and/orprohibition denied, 285 U.S. 526 (1932); Hoyt, Legislative History, I
WEST CT. CL. DIGEST at xiii (1950); Richardson, History, Jurisdiction, and Practice of the
Court of Claims of the United States, 17 Ct. Cl. 3 (1882). For a discussion of various aspects of
Court of Claims litigation see Brenner, Judicial Review by Money Judgment in the Court of
Claims, 21 FED. B.J. 179 (1961); Madden, Aspects of Litigation in the Court of Claims, 86
WASH. L. REp. 566 (1958); A Symposium-The United States Court of Claims, 55 GEo. L.J.
393-655 (1967).
20Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612. Initially, the court was "no more than a
commission exercising powers of investigation with the single right of stating its conclusions to
Congress," and "its conclusions and opinions [were] no more than recommendations to
Congress." Pocono Pines Hotels Co. v. United States, 73 Ct. Ci. 447, 466-67, motion to filefor
writ of mandamus and/orprohibition denied, 285 U.S. 526 (1932).
21 Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765.
22 Ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 & 1491 (1964)).
"28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1964), which is derived from the Tucker Act, provides: "The Court of
Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States
founded upon the Constitution, or an Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive
department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or
unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort."
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not exceeding $10,000.4 As with the previous act, however, there was
no provision for satisfaction or enforcement of judicial decrees other
than money judgments. 5 For this reason, the Court of Claim's
jurisdiction has traditionally been construed as limited to suits against
the government for money judgments.2 6
This view as to the court's jurisdiction can be traced directly to the
Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Alire"l and United
States v. Jones.2 s Both suits were instituted in the Court of Claims
requesting specific performance to compel the issue and delivery of a
patent for public land, and in both, the Supreme Court held that the
Court of Claims was without power to give equitable relief by specific
performance.29 In construing the Act of 1863, the Alire opinion
emphasized that the provisions governing Court of Claims procedure
made allowance only for money awards. Thus, it was noted that
section five of that Act, providing for Supreme Court review of Court
of Claims judgments, authorized review only "wherein the amount in
controversy exceeded three thousand dollars."30 It was further pointed
out that section seven, relating to execution of judgments, established
procedure only for the recovery of "sum [s]. '' 3' On the reasoning that
2I At first the district courts could only hear actions for $1,000 or less and the circuit courts
actions for between $1,000 and $10,000. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 359, § 2, 24 Stat. 505. Now
cases involving up to $10,000 may be tried in the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1964).
Actions which could otherwise be brought in the federal district courts under the Tucker Act
must be maintained in the Court of Claims if the claim is for more than $10,000. See Schultz,
Proposed Changes in Government Contract Disputes Settlement: The Legislative Battle Over
the Wunderlich Case, 67 HARV. L. REv. 217, 250 (1953) (proposal that limit be raised at least to
$100,000 in view of intervening economic changes). Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1964)
with id. § 1491.
25 See note 31 infra.
26 The court has limited equitable powers, however. See notes 110 & Ill infra and
accompanying text.
"73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 573 (1867).
2S 131 U.S. 1 (1889).
29Accord, Almour v. Pace, 193 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Gaines v. United States, 131 F.
Supp. 925 (Ct. Cl. 1955) (court held to be without jurisdiction to reinstate discharged employee
and grant him classified civil-service status); Ford Bros. & Co. v. Eddington Distilling Co., 30 F.
Supp. 213 (M.D. Pa. 1939); Kelly v. United States, 133 Ct. Cl. 571 (1956) (suit to reassign civil
service employee to higher GS grade dismissed as being beyond court's money-judgment
jurisdiction); Hart v. United States, 91 Ct. Cl. 308 (1940) (restoration of officer held not within
court's jurisdiction).
" The Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 5, 12 Stat. 766 provides as follows: "That either party
may appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States from any final judgment or decree which
may hereafter be rendered in any case by said court wherein the amount in controversy exceeds
three thousand dollars .... This dollar limitation on Supreme Court review was not dropped
until the passage of the Act of February 13, 1925. ch. 229, § 3, 43 Stat. 936, 939.
11 The Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 7, 12 Stat. 765, 766 provides as follows: "That in all
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the "power given to render a judgment necessarily restrains the
general terms" of the jurisdictional grant, it was concluded that the
statute "confines the subject-matter to cases in which the petitioner
sets up a moneyed demand as due from the government."'' 2
Undertaking the same type of analysis, the Court in Jones found that
under the Tucker Act, "jurisdiction as to subject matter" of both the
Court of Claims and the district and circuit courts was "properly
applicable only to a money claim."33 Perhaps a more meaningful
explanation, however, was articulated in the Court's concluding
statement:
[W]e should have been somewhat surprised to find that the
administration of vast public interests, like that of the public lands,
which belong so appropriately to the political department, had been
cast upon the courts-which it surely would have been, if such a wide
door had been opened for suing the government to obtain patents and
establish land claims .... I"
While the technical grounding of these decisions was the absence
of procedures for enforcement of judgments for specific relief or,
indeed, for any relief other than a money judgment, the concluding
remarks in Jones suggest two underlying considerations. In the
absence of explicit congressional authorization, the Supreme Court
seems to have been uneasy over the possibility, on the one hand, of a
flood of claims against the government' and, on the other hand, of
injecting itself into the operations of the executive department by
direct coercion of federal officials.3 6
Whether the Supreme Court in Jones did in fact distinguish relief
from jurisdiction when it defined "jursdiction as to subject matter"
strictly in terms of "money claims" can only be a matter of
speculation. It is clear, however, that the concept of money-judgment
jurisdiction, which firmly entrenched itself in subsequent cases, was
premised on an equation of remedy and jurisdiction," or, more
cases of final judgments by said court, or on appeal by the said Supreme Court where the same
shall be affirmed in favor of the claimant, the sum due thereby shall be paid out of any general
appropriation made by law for the payment and satisfaction of private claims . This
section was not repealed by the Tucker Act.
"United States v. Alire, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 573, 576 (1867).
"United States v. Jones, 131 U.S. 1, 19 (1889).
Id. (emphasis added).
"An avalanch of claims against the governments has apparently not occurred in Europe
where the governments commonly accept financial responsibility for their acts. See note 16
supra.
36 See text accompanying notes 70-71 infra.
"The equation of remedy and jurisdiction has occurred in other areas. In New Jersey, where
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specifically, the necessity of a remedy for the existence of jurisdiction.
An unarticulated, corollary proposition was that a court's jurisdiction
would probably expand with the addition of a remedy. It was not
surprising, therefore, that when declaratory relief became available in
"courts of the United States""9 in 1934, the first court to consider its
applicability to Tucker Act litigation suggested that jurisdiction
would be expanded. Thus, in Twin Cities Properties, Inc. v. United
States,39 plaintiff realty company brought an action under the Tucker
Act in the Court of Claims to declare that a certain lease agreement
was binding on the United States, and that plaintiff was entitled to
receive rent thereunder. In dismissing the petition the Court of Claims
found that the requisite jurisdiction was not provided for by the
Declaratory Judgment Act, and that declaratory proceedings were
wholly alien to the court. It was reasoned that "[i]f Congress had
intended to extend the scope of this court's jurisdiction and subject the
United States to the declaratory judgment act, . . .express language
would have been used to do so. ... "I'
Conceivably, the court might have contended that an expansion of
Tucker Act jurisdiction to allow declaratory relief would violate
Congress' express intent that the Declaratory Judgment Act apply
only to cases "within its jurisdiction." Instead, only cursory judicial
notice was taken of legislative intent. However, by requiring a totally
unambiguous congressional statement vesting the Court of Claims
with authority to grant declaratory relief, the decision affirmed the
reluctance initially demonstrated in Jones to allow suits-against the
United States in the absence of express statutory authorization.4'
the administration of justice was at one time divided between courts of law and equity,
jurisdiction was denied in equity courts when the dispute was essentially a legal question. See,
e.g., Wight v. Board of Educ., 99 N.J. Eq. 843, 133 A. 387 (1926). In addition, courts have
refused jurisdiction where the dispute was of a political nature, saying that the remedy lies in
Congress and the people rather than in the courts. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). In
spite of the full faith and credit clause, courts need not enforce equitable decrees of sister states
where the forum lacks remedial machinery. For example, in Consolidated Copper Mines Corp.
v. Nevada Consolidated Copper Co., 127 Misc. 71, 215 N.Y.S. 265 (1926), an action was
brought in New York under a Nevada statute providing for treble damages for trespass upon ore
mines if done in bad faith, and provided that the judge could order a survey of the land and place
a lien upon it. In dismissing the suit it was held that the Nevada statute was a special statutory
remedy enforceable only in Nevada. See also Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904);
Fall v. Eastin, 75 Neb. 104, 113 N.W. 175 (1907).
3' This term was not defined by the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934. See J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 57.02(4) (1966).
11 81 Ct. Cl. 655 (1935).
41 Id. at 658.
" See note 90 infra.
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Here, the Twin Cities court found support in two cases standing for
the positions that a presumption exists against the suability of the
federal government which must be overcome by statute,42 and that a
statutory waiver of sovereign immunity is to be strictly construed.' It
seems apparent, therefore, that the court's original hostility to
declaratory relief emanated from the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Thus, the concept of money-judgment jurisdiction remained
unaffected by the passage of the Declaratory Judgment Act, and in
subsequent cases the Court of Claims invariably held that it was
without power to render declaratory judgments. 44 The same was
generally true of the district courts and courts of appeals in their
limited concurrent jurisdiction under the Tucker Act,4 even though,
concomitantly, they granted declaratory relief under other special
jurisdictional statutes such as the Suits in Admiralty Act46 and the
" Eastern Transp. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 675, 686 (1927) (suit to determine whether
Suits in Admiralty Act would permit libellant to proceed against Government where proceeding
in rem was unavailable).
," United States v. Michel, 282 U.S. 656, 660 (1931) (taxpayer's claim filed beyond the
statutory period). For a later case tending to support this view see United States v. Sherwood,
312 U.S. 584 (1941).
" Many of these cases are cited in notes 47-50 infra. While the Supreme Court has never
considered application of the Declaratory Judgment Act to Tucker Act litigation, it has in
several decisions since 1934 had occasion to repeat the oft-noted statement as to the court's
"money damage" jurisdiction. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 557 (1962); United
States v. Jones, 336 U.S. 641,670 (1949).
" The Declaratory Judgment Act clearly applies to the district courts and courts of appeals;
therefore it might seem that there would be no question as to their power to grant declaratory
relief in any type of case. At least one reason for their holding to the contrary is that their power
to grant relief under the Tucker Act has been said to be no greater or less than that possessed by
the Court of Claims over the same kind of case. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584,
591 (1941) (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure held not to affect district court's Tucker Act
jurisdiction so as to permit joinder of private defendants).
"Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (1964). In American-Foreign S.S. Corp. v.
United States, 291 F.2d 598, 604 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 895 (1961), the court permitted
an action for declaratory relief stating: "The Suits in Admiralty Act does not specifically
sanction declaratory relief against the United States. However, nowhere in that statute is there
any indication that the significant reforms later introduced by the Declaratory Judgment Act
• . . should not be applicable to admiralty courts and to libels in admiralty against the
government. Furthermore, the wording of the Declaratory Judgment Act makes it broadly
applicable to 'any court of the United States' which would include, presumably, the admiralty
courts." See also Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1963); American
President Lines v. United States, 162 F. Supp. 732, 739 (D. Del. 1958), affd per curian, 265
F.2d 552 (3d Cir. 1959). Declaratory relief in admiralty suits was provided by the 1961
amendment to the Rules of Practice in Admiralty and Maritime Cases. See Luckenbach S.S.
Co. v. United States, 292 F.2d 913, 917 n.6 (Ct. Cl. 1961): "The Declaratory Judgment Act
* . * is applicable in 'any court of the United States,' and no exception is made for the
admiralty courts."
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Federal Tort Claims Act.47 Most of the decisions, however, failed to
represent clear holdings that the Declaratory Judgment Act did not
apply to Tucker Act litigation.4" A number of suits requesting
declaratory relief were turned down either because no relief of any
" Federal t ort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.). Pennsylvania R. R. v. United States, Ill F. Supp. 80, 86 (D.N.J. 1953), concerned a
complicated situation involving the Tort Claims Act, where the plaintiff sought a declaratory
judgment to determine the various rights of the many parties. In allowing such a proceeding, the
court viewed it as merely a "procedural" step in the development of a "money claim." But see
Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 134 (D.D.C. 1950) (semble), affd on other
grounds, 194 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1951). It is important that the Tort Claims Act is similar to
the Tucker Act in that it gives the district courts exclusive jurisiction of "civil actions on claims
against the United States,fornoney damages." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964) (emphasis added).
Another example is the Trading With the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 9(a) (1964). In
Brownell v. Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co., 211 F.2d 121, 128 (9th Cir. 1954), a licensee brought an
action seeking a declaratory judgment that a certain licensing agreement was enforceable and an
injunction to prevent the government from granting further licenses to third parties. In holding
the agreement legal, the court reasoned that while "[i]t is true that the Declaratory Judgment
Act. . . is not a consent of the United States to be sued, and merely grants an additional reme-
dy in cases where jurisdiction already exists," jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter
was clearly present.
There is also the National Service Life Insurance Act, 38-U.S.C. §§ 701-25 (1964). In Unger
v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 281, 283-84 (E.D. I11. 1948), plaintiff sought a declaration of his
right to insurance. In granting jurisdiction, the court reasoned that if the Act authorizes suit
against the Government, then it is "only reasonable to hold that congress [sic] intended to
consent to the use of Declaratory [sic] judgment procedure."
Finally, certain relevant action has taken place regarding 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (1964). In
Pettengill v. United States, 205 F. Supp. 10, 12 (D. Vt. 1962) (alternative holding), the court
permitted an action for a declaratory judgment seeking to free certain property owned by
plaintiffs from tax liens of the government. In Soniz v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 762, 764
(D.N.J. 1963), resort to the Declaratory Judgment Act was held unnecessary in a section 2410
suit since an action to quiet title was said to be, in essence, a declaratory action. See also Falik v.
United States, 343 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1965). But in Zito v. Tesoriero, 239 F. Supp. 354 (E.D.N.Y.
1965), an action to declare plaintiff the rightful owner of certain property, the declaratory
judgment remedy was denied on the grounds that the government had not waived sovereign
immunity.
" See Wells v. United States, 280 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1960) (dictum); Cobb v. United States,
240 F. Supp. 574, 577-79 (W.D. Ark. 1965) (dictum); Lowe v. United States, 37 F. Supp. 817
(D.N.J. 1941) (dictum); Shaw v. United States, 357 F.2d 949, 963 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (limiting a
money recovery to the amount owing at the date of judgment). See also Severein v. United
States, 99 Ct. Cl. 435, 443 (1943) (alternative holding) (Tucker Act does not supply jurisdiction
to grant nominal damages). In Severein the court relied on the "Gold Clause" case, Nortz v.
United States, 294 U.S. 317, 327 (1935). Accord, Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 335
(1935). Neither Perry nor Nortz are meaningful precedent to the issue here. In each case the
Supreme Court found that the plaintiff's claim was inevitably for nominal damages only, and
that the Court of Claims had "no authority to entertain an action for nominal damages." Id. at
355. It is clear in the context of the decision, however, that this statement simply indicates that
the judicial authority of the Court of Claims, as of all federal courts, is confined to real cases and
controversies.
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kind could be granted 49 or because the restrictions on other forms of
available relief would be improperly circumvented.'"
"Situations in which declaratory relief has been denied on grounds of a court's lack of
authority to grant any relief are illustrated by the following examples:
(i) Where the Government has not consented to be sued on a particular cause of action. See
Savorgnan v. United States, 171 F.2d 155, 159 (7th Cir. 1948), afj'don other grounds, 338 U.S.
491 (1950) (action to declare plaintiff an American citizen); Bell v. United States, 203 F. Supp.
371, 374 (W.D. Wis. 1962) (alternative holding) (action by released prisoner for a declaration
discharging him from all parole supervision); Birge v. United States, I I I F. Supp. 685 (W.D.
Okla. 1953) (suit to declare insured's right to have a disability-income clause added to policy);
Schilling v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Mich. 1951) (no provision for judicial
review); Commers v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 943, 949-50 (D. Mont. 1946) (alternative
holding), affdper curiant, 159 F.2d 248 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 807 (1947) (action by
disabled serviceman to declare his induction a taking of property thereby entitling him to
compensation); Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. United States, 364 F.2d 415, 419-20 (Ct. Cl. 1966)
(intervenor's counterclaim against government for declaratory judgment that plaintiff's patent
was invalid).
(ii) Where the matter is non-justiciable because committed to exclusive agency discretion.
See Love v. United States, 108 F.2d 43, 50 (8th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 673 (1940)
(plaintiff seeking declaration that he was entitled to a certain type of government job); Wohl
Shoe v. Wirtz, 246 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Mo. 1965) (action to declare employers' exemption of
liability under Fair Labor Standards Act); New York Technical Institute of Maryland, Inc. v.
Limburg, 87 F. Supp. 308, 311-13 (D. Md. 1949) (alternative holding) (suit to declare veteran
not subject to certain cost data regulation in computing tuition grant).
(iii) Where the cause of action is invalid because not based on any constitutional or statutory
right. See Drill v. United States, 157 Ct. Cf. 945 (1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963) (action
to declare veteran's right to federal employment).
(iv) Where there is no jurisdiction over the subject matter except in the Court of Claims. See
Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 278 F.2d 912 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 894
(1960) (amount in contract suit exceeded $10,000); Powers v. United States, 218 F.2d 828 (7th
Cir. 1954); Richfield Oil Corp. v. United States, 207 F.2d 864, 868, 871-72 (9th Cir. 1953)
(alternative holding); Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United States, 194 F.2d 145, 150 (D.C. Cir. 195 1).
° The following examples illustrate situations in which declaratory relief has been denied in
order to prevent frustration of another specific remedial scheme:
(i) Rather than relying on the specific exclusion of suits "with respect to federal taxes" in the
Declaratory Judgment Act, some courts have denied declaratory relief, instead, on the ground it
would subvert Tax Court procedures. See Balistrieri v. United States, 303 F.2d 617 (7th Cir.
1962); Zito v. Tesoriero, 239 F. Supp. 354 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
(ii) Since habeas corpus is the accepted remedy for prisoners, courts are reluctant to allow
prisoners to by-pass this type of proceeding with a declaratory judgment action. Where a writ of
habeas corpus is available, the court might avoid the problem by considering the petition for a
declaratory judgment as being one for a writ of habeas corpus. On the other hand, declaratory
relief has been denied where habeas corpus proceedings were unavailable, the court saying either
that the petition was premature or that the petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies. For example, in Innes v. Hiatt, 57 F. Supp. 17 (M.D. Pa. 1944), the court, denying a
prisoner's action for a declaration as to the proper manner of computing the length of his
sentence, reasoned that even if the petition had been considered as being an application for a writ
of habeas corpus, it would have been premature inasmuch as the petitioner had not served his full
sentence less "good time" deductions. See Gibson v. United States, 161 F.2d 973 (6th Cir. 1947)
(prisoner seeking by declaratory judgment adjudication of basis of deduction of time for good
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ALLOWANCE OF DECLARATORY RELIEF
While many cases are clearly in line with Twin Cities,5' two
decisions in particular suggested that the Court of Claims might be
ready to re-examine its position. In Raydist Navigation Corp. v.
United States,2 a federal district court for the first time extended
declaratory relief to Tucker Act litigation on the grounds that, while
the Declaratory Judgment Act granted merely an additional remedy
rather than a waiver of sovereign immunity, the Government had
already given its consent to be sued under the Tucker Act. Implicit in
the Raydist decision was a rejection of the rationale in Twin Cities
that permission to render declaratory judgments in Tucker Act
conduct from his sentence); United States v. Rollnick, 33 F. Supp. 863, 866-67 (M.D. Pa. 1940)
(plaintiff suing to correct a sentence imposed by another court).
(iii) Litigants refusing to follow statutory procedures cannot obtain declaratory relief on a
theory that such refusal constitutes an "actual controversy" under the Declaratory Judgment
Act. See Isner v. ICC, 90 F. Supp. 361, 366 (E.D. Mich. 1950).
(iv) Where the recommendation of an agency is required for the granting of certain benefits,
and no statutory rules have been laid down to guide such recommendations, it has been held that
a judicial probe of the agency's reasoning ""would amount to a clear invasion of the legislative
and executive domains.'" Gibney v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D. Cal. 1956),
quoting United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371, 380 (1940). See also Wells v.
United States, 280 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1960).
11 In United States Rubber Co. v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 492, 500 (Ct. Cl. 1958),
plaintiff sought a declaration of its right to recover excess unemployment compensation taxes
accruing in future years where they were traceable to a certain war contract. In Yeskel v. United
States, 31 F. Supp. 956, 957-58 (D.N.J. 1940) (alternative holding), plaintiff sought to
determine by a declaratory judgment its rights in a government contract so as to establish a
defense to a suit the government might bring against him. And in Prentiss v. United States, 115
Ct. Cl. 78 (1949), an active Army officer sought a declaration of his right to retirement pay
under the Civil Service Retirement Act. In all three cases, declaratory relief was denied on the
grounds that the court's jurisdiction was limited to suits for money judgment or that the
Declaratory Judgment Act did not apply to Tucker Act litigation. See Clay v. United States,
210 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 927 (1954) (suit under Tucker Act seeking
judgment declaring void an assignment of certain letters patent held beyond court's subject-
matter jurisdiction); Di Battista v. Swing, 135 F. Supp. 938 (D. Md. 1955) (suit to declare that
alien had not breached his immigration bond denied in absence of money-judgment claim).
52 144 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Va. 1956). The proceeding arose out of the contentions of the United
States that Raydist had charged inflated costs under a completed cost-plus contract with the
United States. As all payments under that contract had been completed, it withheld a portion of
the alleged overpayments from funds due under a later contract with Raydist, and apparently
threatened to continue this practice. Thereafter, Raydist sought and obtained declaratory relief.
With citation to the decisions in Pennsylvania R. R. v. United States, I ll F. Supp. 80 (D.N.J.
1953), and Brownell v. Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co., 211 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1954), inter alia, the
court explained: "While it is undoubtedly true that the Declaratory Judgment Act ... is not a
consent of the United States to be sued, and merely grants an additional remedy in cases where
jurisdiction already exists, it follows that where, as here, the United States has given its consent
to be sued under the Tucker Act. . .and the unusual nature of the circumstances are such as fo
justify an initial determination of the rights of the parties, a proceeding by way of declaratory
judgment is deemed appropriate." 144 F. Supp. at 505.
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proceedings would constitute an additional consent by the
Government to be sued. Although Raydist has essentially stood alone
for this proposition, in 1967 the Court of Claims expressly reserved
consideration of its jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment
Act." Thus, the court's reversal in King was not altogether
unexpected.
Jurisdiction Analysis. Instead of advocating a strict construction
of statutory language, which was the basis of the court's holding in
Twin Cities, the Government chose a slightly different approach in
King. It reasoned that the Court of Claims was restricted to rendering
money judgments; that its jurisdiction would be extended by the
availability of declaratory relief; that the Declaratory Judgment Act
did not grant additional jurisdiction to any court; and that, therefore,
the Act did not apply to the Court of Claims. 4 In rebutting this
argument, it was critically important to demonstrate that the addition
of declaratory relief to the court's remedial powers would not
necessarily extend its jurisdiction. For this proposition, the court
relied on Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,5 in which the
Supreme Court succinctly defined the purpose of Congress in passing
the Declaratory Judgment Act:
Congress enlarged the range of remedies available in the federal
courts but did not extend their jurisdiction ... [and] jurisdiction
means the kind of issues which give right of entrance to federal
courts. Jurisdiction in this sense was not altered by the Declar-
atory Judgment Act. 6
The court also recognized that under the Tucker Act a claim must be
founded upon "the Constitution, a statute, a regulation, or contract,
or must be nontortious in character,"" and, to satisfy Supreme Court
precedent, must in some way demand the payment of money. It was
then concluded that declaratory relief would not extend the court's
jurisdiction beyond this category of claims because, by requiring the
action to be directed toward a money judgment, it would merely
enable claimants to initiate proceedings at an earlier stage, even prior
to the accrual of damages.
5' Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1007 n.5 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
Defendant's Response To Plaintiff's Brief on The Applicability Of The Declaratory
Judgment Act To This Court And To This Case, July 19, 1967, at 3-6.
" 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
56 Id. at 671 (emphasis added).
390 F.2d at 908.
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As an indication of the underlying significance of the court's
holding, claimants in contractual disputes, for example, need not
delay action until the dispute has completely matured." In those
instances where a government contract is reformed to a party's
disadvantage, he should be able to bring suit immediately, whereas
previously he was barred from instituting proceedings until money on
the contract became due. 9 Similarly, in civil and military cases, a
claimant should be entitled to bring an action prior to the time when
such payment becomes due, provided administrative remedies have
been exhausted 60 and other jurisdictional requisites are present. It
would appear, therefore, that the availability of declaratory relief
could be viewed as similar to an affirmation of ripeness in suits here-
tofore said to be premature.6'
The court's reasoning may at first appear erroneous in that, while
it implies that jurisdiction might exist regardless of whether the
Declaratory Judgment Act was in existence, it is apparent that new
legal interests are afforded protection. This confusion stems from the
courts' use of the term jurisdiction in at least two different senses 62
without distinguishing its respective meanings.63 On the one hand,
11 For a discussion of the availability of declaratory relief when the plaintiff has a matured
cause of action see Note, Declaratory Judgment and Matured Causes ofAction, 53 COLUM. L.
REV. 1130 (1953).
"See Oceanic S.S. Co. v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 217 (1964). In operating-differential
subsidy contracts, a matured claim does not arise until the completion of the annual accounting.
This can involve delays of prodigious proportions.
6 Few rules are better settled than the requirement that the plaintiff must exhaust his
administrative remedies before he can file his petition in the Court of Claims. See, e.g., United
States v. Anthony Grace & Sons, Inc., 384 U.S. 424,429-30 (1966). Most of the cases coming to
the Court of Claims have been sifted through administrative proceedings. Jaffe, Remand Powers
of the Court of Claims, 56 GEo. L.J. 444, 453 (1967). Where the administrative process has not
been exhausted, declaratory relief is usually denied. See Macauley v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 327
U.S. 540.544-45 (1946). However, if there is a showing of inadequacy of the administrative
remedy and of impending harm, the agency can sometimes be circumvented. See Aircraft &
Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 773-74 (1947); Order of Railway Conductors of
Am. v. Swan, 329 U.S. 520, 524-25 (1947). There seems to be no compelling reasons why the
same rules should not apply to declaratory relief in Tucker Act litigation.
" For a discussion of the relationship between ripeness and declaratory relief see E.
BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGNIENTS 56-71 (2d ed. 1941) [hereinafter cited as BORCHARD].
62 BORCHARD 232: "It may be conceded that the word 'jurisdiction' is often used ambiguously.
It is used (1) in its stricter sense ifs judicial authority over subject-matter and parties; and (2) as
the privilege and power to grant specific relief in cases within such authority."
" I J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 129-30 (4th ed. 1918), speaks of jurisdiction in
two senses: (1) "the power residing in such course to determine judicially a given action,
controversy, or question presented to it for decision," id. at 153-54; (2) "the power to hear
certain kinds and classes of civil causes according to theprinciples of the method and procecure
adopted by the court of chancery. ... Id. at 156.
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jurisdiction is taken to mean judicial aputhority to hear and decide
cases.6 4 So when the Court of Claims in Twin Cities concluded that
declaratory relief would extend its jurisdiction, it was correct in the
sense that the Declaratory Judgment Act enabled courts to entertain
suits previously barred from their consideration. On the other hand,
the term jurisdiction is also used in the more limited sense of judicial
authority over subject matter and person. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter, meaning the class of cases on which a court has capacity to
act, 65 was not expanded by the Declaratory Judgment Act.6 6 Since the
Act itself refers only to subject-matter jurisdiction when its
applicability is restricted to cases within a court's jurisdiction, 67 the
Government's argument in King, that the expansion of the court's
jurisdiction would do violence to the purpose of that Act, was without
merit. While the discussion in King is somewhat misleading because
of its failure to distinguish adequately between these two separate
usages of the term jurisdiction, it is clearly an overstatement of the
court's position to say that its jurisdiction would in no way be
expanded by the addition of declaratory relief. In addition, since the
concept of money-judgment jurisdiction formulated in Alire and
Jones delineates solely the category of claims subject to adjudication
under the Tucker Act and is, therefore, an offshoot of the concept of
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court was clearly correct in assuming
that declaratory relief would not result in its enlargement so long as
the claims remained money-related."'
" See Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U.S. 374, 381 n.10 (1936); Acadia Land
Co. v. Horuff, 110 F.2d 354, 355 n. I (5th Cir. 1940).
65 Honea v. Graham, 66 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) (jurisdiction of subject matter
defined as power over "the class of cases to which particular cases belong").
'6See Southern Pac. Co. v. McAdoo, 82 F.2d 121, 122 (9th Cir. 1936); Putnam v. Ickes, 78
F.2d 223, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1935); Hary v. United Elec. Coal Co., 8 F. Supp. 655, 656 (E.D. Ill.
1934); BORCHARD 233.
67 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964) permits a court to tender a declaratory judgment only in cases
"within its jurisdiction." If jurisdiction were used in its broadest sense, declaratory relief would
be available only in those instances where the plaintiff had a matured claim for money or
coercive relief. The Act has not been construed in this manner by federal courts. Some state
courts have even held that the existence of another adequate remedy precludes declaratory relief.
See, e.g., Burke v. Gardner, 221 Ind. 262, 47 N.E. 148 (1943) (declaration denied where
injunction available).
63 Arguably, the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction would not be affected even in non-money-
related cases if the claim against the Government was founded upon the Constitution, a statute,
a regulation, a contract, or was non-tortious in character. In other words, these five causes of
action under the Tucker Act might be viewed as the class of cases on which the court has
capacity to act. The issue is probably moot, however, because the Declaratory Judgment Act has
been viewed in a different light. In Putnam v. Ickes, 78 F.2d 223, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1935), the court
said: "We think it is clear from any reasonable construction of the acts that the Declaratory
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The Specific Relief Problem. Because one of the Supreme Court's
principal concerns in A lire and Jones was the direct coercion of public
officials, the Court of Claims went to great lengths in demonstrating
that "the coercive effect of money and declaratory judgments differs
markedly from that of the specific equitable sanctions.1 69 When a
court issues a decree for specific relief, such as an injunction to
prevent an administrative official from engaging in a designated
activity, it is directed at a particular administrator and commands
obedience." In both Jones and Alire, specific relief would have
required a court order commanding an affirmative transfer of public
lands by a government official, who would thereafter become
personally liable in tort for damages upon failure to comply. It can be
argued that any judgment, even a declaratory or money judgment,
inevitably must have a "coercieve effect," because it constitutes notice
to all officials that, unless their conduct is changed, similar awards
will be rendered to all subsequent plaintiffs. In consequence, a change
in their conduct is demanded7' unless they are willing to risk censure
or perhaps civil liability. In actuality, the impact of money and
declaratory judgments does not stem from fear of personal
consequences brought about by court action against delinquent
bureaucrats but, rather, from a volitional reaction of responsible
government officials who otherwise may risk losing their positions
through the elective or appointive process. Declaratory and money
Judgment Act has not given the courts jurisdiction . . . if affirmative relief were being sought
.... It clearly follows, we think, that in any actual controversy wherein the court otherwise
has jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties the court has power to determine the rights
of the petitioner, although the case may not have developed to a point wherein affirmative relief
could be given. This is as far as the act goes." It appears, therefore, that the availability of
declaratory relief depends upon the availability of affirmative relief. See Southern Pac. Co. v.
McAdoo, 82 F.2d 121, 122 (9th Cir. 1936); Johnston v. Town of Deerfield, 25 F. Supp. 918 (D.
Mass.), affd per curiam, 306 U.S. 621 (1939) (no declaration because there was no basis for
equitable relief; Lake Erie Provision Co. v. Moore, 11 F. Supp. 522 (N.D. Ohio 1935) (no
declaration because there was no power of injunction to make it effective). BORCHARD, at 233-
34, notes two exceptions to this rule: declaration of liens and priorities. In New Jersey, where the
courts of law and equity were at one time separate, declaratory relief in an equity court would
usually be denied where the question involved was purely legal. Id. at 242-47. All this seems to
indicate that declaratory relief should not be available in non-money-related Tucker Act claims
since they are not otherwise reviewable. See note 87 infra.
69 390 F.2d at 905.
" See United States v. Boutwell, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 604, 607 (1873) (writ of mandamus
commands officer to obey, and in default the costs will fall upon him).
11 Once declaratory relief has been obtained, a coercive judgment compelling performance of
duty is rarely required because most officials obey court decisions. BORCHARD 876, 896.
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judgments against the Government are similar in their restraining
force, also, in that both are mere statements of rights 2 and neither is
enforceable in the absence of congressional approval of expendi-
tures.7 Finally, one of the motivating forces behind the Declaratory
Judgment Act was a desire to obviate the hostility to extensive
use of the courts' injunctive powers. 4 For these reasons, the King
court was unconvinced that declaratory relief would conflict with the
A lire-Jones rationale.
Congressional Intent. Turning to the issue of Congress' intent in
passing the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, the opinion in King
concluded that the Act's applicability to the Court of Claims was
probably not within Congress' express contemplation during either
the passage of the Act in 1934 or the revision of the United States
Code in 1948. Further, even if a change in the law to include the Court
of Claims within the provisions of the Act was intended by Congress
in 1948, such an extension having no intended effect on a court's
subject-matter jurisdiction, would probably not have been considered
controversial. In contrast to Twin Cities, the court in King undertook
a thorough analysis of the history of the Act before arriving at this
conclusion. Specifically, the court's attention was focused on whether
Congress intended to include the Court of Claims within the phrase
"courts of the United States," as that phrase was used in the Act to
denominate the judicial agencies authorized to grant declaratory
relief. This inquiry would seem to have been obviated by the 1948
revision which rephrased the Act to apply to "any court of the United
States'"' 7 and explicitly included the Court of Claims within this
definition. 76 Nevertheless, the issue was unsettled due to statements
during the revision, for instance, that "great care [was] exercised to
make no changes in the existing law which would not meet with
substantially unanimous approval."" In addition, nothing in the
11 BORCHARD 371: "It is not surprising therefore that we find petitions of right expressly
seeking declaratory judgments. All actions against the United States under the Tucker Act of
1887 and other statutes might well have been so framed." It is an extremely rare occurrence,
however, when the Government refuses to pay a judgment in the Court of Calims.
73 Judgments of the Court of Claims in excess of $100,000 are certified to Congress for
appropriation by the Secretary of the Treasury. 28 U.S.C. § 2518 (1964). Judgments of
$100,000 or less are paid out of a permanent reolving fund. Act of July 27, 1956, ch. 748,
§ 1302, 70 Stat. 694. In either case, actual payment is made by the General Accounting Office,
28 U.S.C. § 2517(a).
'4 See S. REP. No. 1005, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934).
75 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964).
76 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 451, 62 Stat. 907 (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1964)).
77 S. REP. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1948).
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legislative history of the codification indicated any intention to
enlarge the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims,78 nor was the court
ever mentioned in the reviser's notes.7 9 For these reasons, an inquiry
into the intent of Congress was not precluded by the revision.
Despite the period over which the legislation was subject to
consideration, the congressional source material is inadequate for a
close analysis of the statutory provisions. As noted by the court,
however, the chief extra-congressional sponsor of the Act, Professor
Borchard, in stating that the Act authorizes declaratory judgments
"within the permitted limits""0 of the Tucker Act, rebutted any
assertion that declaratory relief was to be unavailable in Tucker Act
suits. In addition, the frequent references by legislators to the Act's
procedural aspects as applicable in "federal courts" suggests that the
term was to be given broad, rather than narrow, interpretation.'
Finally, numerous analogies were drawn between declaratory
judgments and money judgments in the Court of Claims 2 On the
" See Hearings on H.R. 3214 Before a Subconim. of Senate Conun. on the Judiciary, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); Hearings on Revisions of Titles 18 and 28 of the United States Code
Before Subcomni. No. I of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); S.
REP. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
The House and Senate debates are reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. SERV., NEw TITLE
28-UNITED STATES CODE 1986-2040 (1948).
" When the 1934 Act was modified in 1948 as part of the general revision of the Judicial Code,
the Revisers noted simply that "changes were made in phraseology." H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th
Cong., Ist Sess. A 138 (1947). See also S. REP. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1948).
The Reviser's notes make no reference to the Tucker Act or the Court of Claims in the com-
ments on Sections 2201-02 (the Declaratory Judgment Act) and state only that Section 451
was "inserted to make possible a greater simplification in consolidation of the provisions
incorporated in this title." 28 U.S.C. §§ 451 & 2201-02 (1964). See also Western Pac.
R.R. v. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. 247, 254-55 (1953) (Reviser's notes are an authoritative
aid for statutory construction).
" BORCHARD 373 (emphasis added): "The introduction of the Federal Declaratory Judgments
Act has raised the question whether the position of the United States Government as a defendant
has been modified and whether the declaratory judgments could now be obtained against the
United States under circumstances outside the terms of the Tucker Act and other statutory
authority accepting liability and subjection to suit. The answer clearly is in the negative. Since
all judgments against the United States, within thepermitted limits, are declaratory in effect, for
if successful they merely declare the amount due by the government, a petition would doubtless
not be dismissed if it sought a declaratory judgment in such cases."
" See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1005, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934); 69 CONG. REC. 1681, 1685, 1686
(1928) (remarks of Representative Celler, Dyer, and Newton); 78 CONG. REC. 10565 (1934)
(remarks of Senator Robinson); Hearings on Legislation Recommended by the Am. Bar Ass'n
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, I1 (1922).
" The final Senate report said: "The decisions of the United States Court of Claims are
essentially declaratory in nature .. " S. REP. No. 1005, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934). For a
similar analogy see Hearings on H.R. 5623 Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 70th Cong.,
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other side were two arguments83 of considerably more dubious merit
based upon "scattered excerpts and inferences." Thus, the court
concluded that legislative history failed to provide "a sound
foundation" as to Congress' intent and that the issue probably never
occurred to Congress at all.8" It is fair to say, however, that such
limited materials as do exist tend to support the view that Congress
considered the legislation as applicable to the Court of Claims.
Sovereign Immunity. Having demonstrated that, despite
Congress' apparent failure to consider the question, the Declaratory
1st Sess. 21 (1928) (remarks of Professor Borchard). Still another argument made by the court
was that the British and New York cases cited to illustrate the benefits of declaratory relief
included claims against a government. See Hearing on Legislation Recommended by the Am.
Bar Ass'n Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 25, at 10 (1922)
(testimony of A.B.A. witness H.W. Taft). See generally 69 CONG. REC. 1687, 2029 (1928)
(remarks of Representative Celler and La Guardia).
A year following passage of the Declaratory Judgment Act, it was amended to exclude
disputes "with respect to Federal taxes," Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 289, § 405, 49 Stat. 1014,
1027, so that the Act would not interfere with the orderly collection of taxes. See S. REP. No.
1240, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1935); H. REP. No. 1885, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1935). For a
criticism of the exception of all tax cases see BORCHARD 850-57. Tax disputes represent 35
percent of the Court of Claim's business. See Peartree, Statistical Analysis of the Court of
Claims, 55 GEo. L.J. 541, 549 (1967). Government contract and civil/military pay cases
represent roughly 25 and 15 percent of the court's business, respectively. See id. Arguably,
Congress' concern indicates that it must have viewed the Act as applicable to litigation under the
Tucker Act and similar statutes waiving sovereign immunity, or else the amendment would have
been unnecessary. The problem with this reasoning is that other tax jurisdictions exist in the
federal courts and, at least now, refund suits in the district courts are not under § 1346(a)(2),
but under § 1346(a)(1) and without any limitation in amount.
"3 First, in House debate on one of the early bills, a statement was made by Committee
Chairman Montague that the Act "applies to Federal district courts and the courts in the
District of Columbia." 66 CONG. REc. 4874 (1925). But nothing in the context in which the
statement was made suggests that it was meant to be a formal definition of the scope of the Act.
Second, while it is now established that the Court of Claims is a constitutional court, see Glidden
Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), in 1933 it was said to be a legislative court in Williams v.
United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933). Since the constitutionality of the Act was phrased in terms
of its consistency with Article I11, and since no reference was made to the lack of Article III
restraints on legislative courts, this might be argued as an indication of Congress' intention not
to include such courts. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S.
438, 455 (1929), affirmatively recognized that the Court of Claims should be considered a "court
of the United States" as that phrase is used in federal legislation.
" 390 F.2d at 25. The following contentions could be made: (a) the language of the 1934 Act,
"courts of the United States," does not apply clearly on its face to the Court of Claims; (b) Twin
Cities in effect dictates that the law existing at the time of the 1948 revision was against applica-
tion of the Declaratory Judgment Act to the Court of Claims; (c) the 1948 revision was not in-
tended to make great changes in the law; therefore, (d) the Act was not made applicable to the
Court of Claims by the revision. The weakness of this argument lies in the fact that the Twin
Cities decision was apparently never called to Congress' attention. Id. at 27 n.4 1. Even Profes-
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Judgment Act clearly applied on its face to the Court of Claims, the
court was faced with the problem of reconciling two rules of statutory
construction with the doctrine of sovereign immunity. On the one
hand, the plain-meaning rule coupled with the legislative intent
consideration indicated that, in the absence of an unmistakably clear
legislative expression to the contrary, the Court of Claims was
empowered to apply declaratory relief.5 On the other hand, the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, and its corrollary proposition that
any waiver must be strictly construed, 6 seemed to support the
sor Borchard seems to have interpreted Twin Cities as holding only that declaratory relief can-
not be given outside the court's general jurisdiction.
SS f he primary rule of intepretition of statutes is traditionally stated as being to give effect to
the intention of the legislature. See Williams v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 236
U.S. 549 (1915). This intention is often unclear; therefore, numerous rules of statutory
construction, many of which are conflicting, have been formulated. For a list of 28 conflicting
rules see Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950). The two canons
most frequently employed are the plain meaning rule and the legislative intent rule. The plain
meaning rule is simply one under which the courts will not look beyond the words of a statute if
the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face. The exception is that if the literal construction
of a statute will lead to an absurd or unreasonable result, then extrinsic materials will be utilized
in order to ascertain the true intention of the legislature. Compare United States v. Missouri
Pac. Ry., 278 U.S. 269 (1929) with Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930). At the federal
level the rule is seldom applied in its full vigor. Note, Trends in the Use of Extrinsic Aids in
Statutory Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV. 586, 595 (1950). Therefore, the legislative intent rule
is dominant today, and the main problems concern the proper weight to be given the various
extrinsic aids in ascertaining the legislature's intent. Even language clear on its face will not be
followed if a contrary intent appears in legislative history. See United States v. Dickerson, 310
U.S. 554, 562 (1940). However, where legislative history of the statute involved is found
ambiguous and unconvincing, it appears that the plain meaning rule will be applied. See Fourco
v. Transmira Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1957); United States v. National City Lines,
337 U.S. 78, 80-84 (1949); Ex Parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949). See generally Horack,
Congressional Silence: A Tool of Judicial Supremacy, 25 TEXAS L. REV. 247 (1947); Jones,
The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 25 WASH.
U.L.Q. 2 (1939); MacCallum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754 (1966).
1 See, e.g., Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270,276 (1957); Danning v. United States, 259
F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 911 (1959); Wells v. United States, 214 F.2d 380
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 855 (1954).
The tradition of strict interpretation of statutes waiving the immunity of the United States
to suit seems to have been established in the early cases under the Court of Claims Act. See, e.g.,
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 28-41 (1924). Arguably, however, once
the government has waived immunity to suit by statute, suability rather than immunity should
be the assumption. There now appears to be such an assumption" when a federal agency, rather
than the United States itself, is the defendant. See Keifer & Keifer'v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp.,
306 U.S. 381 (1939): While the Keifer case marks the beginning of a series of cases expressilig
misgivings about sovereign immunity, the policy has been irregular. In 1941, Justice Stone
stated that "consent, since it is a relinquishment of a sovereign immunity, must be strictly
interpreted." Unitea States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590 (1941). But three years later the
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rationale of Twin Cities because legislative history revealed no express
Congressional intent that the Act applied to the Court of Claims. The
decision in Twin Cities, however, was based on an assumption that by
permitting suits theretofore barred from the court's consideration, the
Act would expand its jurisdiction and thereby constitute a consent to
be sued. This assumption was shown to be erroneous in that, by
limiting declaratory relief to actions directed toward a money
judgment, the Act could be construed so as not to alter the court's
subject-matter jurisdiction. The question became, therefore, exactly
how express must a waiver of sovereign immunity be when only a new
procedural"' vehicle of relief is afforded. Should the doctrine of
sovereign immunity require, in addition to unambiguous statutory
language, an affirmative showing of congressional intent?8
court found that a waiver of sovereign immunity by the federal government in a state court could
be "implied" from a grant of state court jurisdiction in actions to partition Indian lands in which
the United States was held to be a "necessary party." United States v. Hellard, 322 U.S. 363,
368-69 (1944). And in Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215 (1945), the Court
construed the Public Vessels Act of 1925 liberally, stating that "Congressional adoption of
broad statutory language authorizing suit was deliberate and is not to be thwarted by an unduly
restrictive interpretation." Id. at 222. In 1949, in its first decision under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, the Court interpreted the act liberally as applying to a soldier hurt while on furlough. See
Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 51 (1949). Two years later, Justice Douglas stated that the
liability of the United States was not to be whittled down "by restrictive and artificial
distinctions." Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 530 (1951). In the following term,
however, construing the Suits in Admiralty Act and the Clarification Act with rigor, the Court
explained: "While, as the court below pointed out, legislation for the benefit of seamen is to be
construed liberally in their favor, it is equally true that statutes which waive immunity of the
United States from suit are to be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign." McMahon v.
United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951). It is evident, therefore, that there is no consistent policy of
interpretation in actions against the United States, and any statement to the effect that a waiver
of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed is certainly tenuous.
"7 The operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural only and does not attempt to
change the essential requisites for the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips
Petroluem Co., 339 U.S. 667, 673-74 (1946); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huggman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth,
300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937); Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288 (1935). A procedural device is
usually thought of as one enabling the courts to treat in a different manner a claim the subject
matter of which is already legally protected. See BORCHARD 15. The distinction between
jurisdiction and procedure was emphasized in Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay & Co., (1915) 2
K.B. 536, 563 (C.A.), where it was said: "But if its only effect is to provide that the court may
deal with a matter with which it can already deal in a different manner under different
circumstances and when brought before it by a different person, it is, in my opinion, only dealing
with practice and procedure and is intra vires .. " It would seem, therefore, that declaratory
relief should be unavilable in those cases where it would have the effect of extending the court's
subject-matter jurisdiction. But see Developments in the Law-Declaratory Judgments, 1941-
1949,62 HARV. L. REV. 787,789 n.14 (1949).
2' Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity it is usually considered that the government's
1190
TUCKER ACT SUITS
Apparently, the court felt that the express language of the Act should
control in such cases in the absence of a contrary legislative intent.
Because the same conclusion would result from an application of the
usual rules of statutory construction, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity was, in effect, rendered inoperative. Thus, the court could
say that "we do not require, as the court in Twin Cities did, a totally
unambiguous Congressional statement vesting us with the authority
to grant declaratory relief against the United States."' 9 The broader
implication may be that the doctrine of sovereign immunity will be
applied with less rigor in cases involving grants of only procedural
advantages."8 If the doctrine of sovereign immunity is merely a rule of
construction giving rise to a presumption which aids in the
determination of legislative intent, the court may be willing to
presume less, and to search more diligently for Congress' intentions.
In any event, the King court was able to conclude that the original
1934 Act adequately empowered it to render declaratory judgments.
Alternatively, the court held that the clear language of the 1948
revision was controlling despite possible discrepancies with the
original Act.'
The Tax Issue. There remained in King, however, the further
question of whether the action was one "with respect to federal taxes,"
a category expressly excluded from the Declaratory Judgment Act. 2
consent to be sued must be found in legislative enactments, see United States v. Sherwood, 312
U.S. 584, 586 (1941); that "the courts may not extend the waiver of immunity [from suit]
beyond the letter of authority given by the statute," Hobby v. Hodges, 215 F.2d 754, 757 (10th
Cir. 1954); and that "such waiver may not be implied in the construction of an ambiguous
statute." General Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 352, 354 (N.D.N.Y. 1953).
Although at least one court has held it to be primarily a matter of legislative intent, see Cyrus v.
United States, 132 F. Supp. 300, 301 (D. Mass. 1955), it does not appear that any court has ever
required a showing in legislative history of Congressional intent to be sued when the statute on
its face permits such suits. The reason is that in most statutes waiving immunity such intent is
apparent from a reading of the act as a whole. However, while the Declaratory Judgment Act on
its face applies to the Court of Claims, it is not obvious that Congress so intended because only
by cross reference to 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1964) does 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1964) explicitly apply
to the Court of Claims. In addition, Section 451 was added subsequent to the passage of the Act,
and there is nothing to indicate that it was intended to be any more than a change in language.
'9390 F.2d at 910.
Heretofore, courts have interpreted sovereign immunity somewhat less strictly in procedural
matters. See Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 386 U.S. 503 (1967); United States v.
Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951); United States v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366
(1949).
" Accord, Continental Cas. Co. v. United States, 314 U.S. 527, 530 (1942); United States v.
Bowen, 100 U.S. 508,513 (1879).
11 See note I supra.
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The court considered the plaintiffs tax motives irrelevant because his
request required merely a declaration of a right to have his military
records changed rather than an interpretation of a tax statute. While
courts have failed to delineate clearly the boundaries of a federal tax
case, the court in King seemed to suggest that it requires both a
request for the express determination of plaintiff's tax liability and an
interpretation and application of the Internal Revenue Code.93 From
an examination of the facts of decided cases, it appears that a simpler
definition might have been given94-namely, an action "with respect
to federal taxes" involves a dispute with tax officials as to petitioner's
tax liability.95 Accordingly, it seems doubtful whether an action
against anyone other than a tax official or the federal government
could ever be considered a "tax case." This point is illustrated by
Stern & Co. v. State Loan & Finance Corp.,6 in which a district court
adjudicated a breach of contract claim. Although not determining tax
consequences, the facts litigated had a direct bearing on tax liability.
Since no dispute with tax authorities was involved, however, the court
was not precluded from exercising its Tucker Act jurisdiction. If,
however, the plaintiff had chosen to bring a declaratory action against
the Commissioner, suit should have been dismissed. Likewise, while
the decision in King was correct in that the dispute concerned a
determination by an Army official, declaratory relief would have been
denied had the action focused on the threatened erroneous acts of the
Internal Revenue Department. For example, in Wilson v. Wilson,97
"390 F.2d at 914: "The determination which plaintiff requests is not a determination of his
tax liability; the interpretation and application of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 104(a)(4). . . is
totally irrelevant to the question he seeks to place before us."
" The court's test is somewhat misleading because an action may be one "with respect to
taxes" even though the case does not turn on the interpretation of tax statutes. For example, if a
dispute arose between the Commissioner and a taxpayer as to whether the latter was married,
and the taxpayer brought an action against the Commissioner to declare his marriage valid
thereby entitling him to the marital deduction, the action would clearly be a tax case even though
the court might be concerned primarily with the interpretation of the state marriage laws. In
other words, courts must often resort to non-tax statutes and even common law to determine tax
liability. See, e.g., Prince v. United States, 127 Ct. Cl. 612, 617 (1954).
" An obvious class of suits falling within this definition are those for a declaratory judgment
with respect to taxes alleged to have been erroneously assessed. See, e.g., Farmer v. Hooks, 194
F. Supp. 1, 2 (E.D. Ky. 1961) (suit dismissed as being beyond court's jurisdiction); Sweeney v.
United States, 285 F.2d 444, 447 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (same).
96205 F. Supp. 702,706 (D. Del. 1962).
97 141 F.2d 599 (4th Cir. 1944). In Wilson, the Commissioner of Revenue informed plaintiff
that the profits of a certain enterprise would be accredited to his account and that he would be
taxed as though he were the sole owner. Claiming that the enterprise was a partnership in which
he and his wife and daughter all had interests, plaintiff brought suit against the Commissioner
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involving an action brought against the Commissioner for a
declaration of plaintiff's interest in a supposed family partnership and
of his right to be taxed accordingly, suit was apparently dismissed as
being one with respect to taxes.90 It seems clear, therefore, that a
petitioner can avoid the tax case exception by framing his request for
declaratory relief in a manner so as not to involve a direct dispute with
revenue officers.99
Statute of Limitations. The decision in King, nevertheless, left
unanswered a number of questions. Presently, the statute of
limitations for the Court of Claims runs for six years00 from the time
when all events have occurred which entitle plaintiff to payment as
claimed."' Arguably, the period should now start from the time when
and others for a declaration of the interests the supposed partners owned and of his right to be
taxed according to the court's finding. The court held that "it was a suit to control them in the
discharge of their official duties and hence a suit against the United States with respect to a
matter as to which it had not consented to be sued." Id. at 600. Since the court of appeals has
jurisdiction to hear tax cases against the Government following a timely refund claim, the only
possible basis for the court's holding was that the action constituted a suit "with respect to
federal taxes."
"
8Accord, England v. United States, 261 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1958) (action to declare
documents of no legal effect); Carmichael v. United States, 245 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1957) (action
to declare taxpayer's status as self-employed); Pilip v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 397 (D.
Alaska 1960) (action to declare that plaintiff was owner of certain property as tenant by the
entirety and that lien filed by defendants did not attach to such property). But see Bulloch v.
Latham, 306 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1962) (action against tax authorities for declaration that certain
property belonged to plaintiff-jurisdiction upheld); Botta v. Scanlon, 288 F.2d 504 (2d Cir.
1961) (action against tax authorities to have assessment declared void-jurisdiction upheld);
Tomlinson v. Smith, 128 F.2d 808 (7th Cir. 1942) (federal taxes exception held not applicable to
suit by third party seeking to protect a lien); Pettengill v. United States, 205 F. Supp. 10 (D. Vt.
1962) (declaratory action seeking to free certain property owned by plaintiffs as tenants by the
entirety from government tax liens).
" Because the exclusion of federal tax cases is couched in very general terms, it might seem
that a broad, non-technical meaning should be given in order to effect Congress' purpose.
Accordingly, a contention could be made that "federal tax cases" means those, such as King, in
which the direct effect of a declaratory judgment would be to alter plaintiff's tax liability.
However, this view would encompass suits obviously not within Congress' contemplation,
because in any suit for a declaration that A owes money to B, for example, significant tax
consequences to B may be involved. It would also require considerable judicial speculation as to
a taxpayer's primary motivations. Professor Borchard states that "the law or court has no
concern with the motive of the plaintiff for bringing the action." BORCHARD 15.
28 U.S.C. § 2501 (1964).
C See Oceanic S.S. Co. v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 217, 225 (1964). Stated differently, "A
cause of action accrues for purposes of the statute of limitations when a suit may first be legally
instituted thereon .. " Ball v. United States, 137 F. Supp. 740, 742 (Ct. Cl. 1956); cf. United
States v. Wurts, 303 U.S. 414, 418 (1938); United States ex rel. Louisville Cement Co. v. ICC,
246 U.S. 638, 644 (1918). In most instances, this means that a claim accrues for purposes of
limitations when a money judgment may first be legally instituted. However, the problem is
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the right to declaratory relief first accrues. °- This view was given
support by the Second Circuit in A merican-Foreign Steamship Corp.
v. United States.'"3 In early 1946, the Government began chartering
for hire many war-built vessels. Later, these charters were cancelled,
and the plaintiffs were offered a more expensive arrangement, which
they signed under protests of illegality. When suits were instituted for
refunds, plaintiffs contended that the two-year limitation of the Suits
in Admiralty Act ran from the time of the final audit of the new
charter agreements, when refunds of all overpayments became due.
The court held, however, that the running of the statute began after
the signing of the new contracts, when action for declaratory relief
could have been sought, or, alternatively, from the first payment of
additional charter hire, when payment could have been refused forcing
the Government to sue. The court's hesitancy in its first holding was
not without reason. Not only was it contrary to the majority view 04
but, in addition, it would transform a mere preventive remedy u0 into a
mandatory action in those instances where a claim for money could
not mature before the running of the statutes. Additionally, in the
latter cases it would encourage the piecemeal litigation of claims' 6
where the claimant prefers to bring action only upon the complete
maturing of the dispute.0 7 Following the Second Circuit would seem,
somewhat more difficult in operating-differential contracts where accountings occur annually,
with a final accounting at the end of the ten-year period. Although an action for money may be
brought after the completion of an annual accounting, the precise amount of the government's
liability is uncertain because of a recapture provision which cannot be determined until the final
accounting. Apparently for this reason, the court in Oceanic held that the statute of limitations
does not run until the final accounting has been completed. In King, the court expressly avoided
the question of "whether the availability of declaratory relief would require a reevaluation of the
Oceanic holding." 390 F.2d at 898 n.6.
"I2 A leading case in support of the rule that the statute should run froin the time a justiciable
controversy arises is Pollack v. Josephy, 162 Misc. 238, 294 N.Y. S. 219 (Sup. Ct. 1937)
(plaintiff's fight to an accounting under a contract with defendant).
103 291 F.2d 598 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 895 (1961). Compare Luckenbach S.S. Co. v.
United States, 312 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1963) (declaration of non-liability).
" See Developments in the Law-Declaratory Judgments, 1941-1949, 62 HARV. L. REv. 787,
830-32 (1949).
"I5 Declaratory relief is a preventive remedy in the sense that it helps to "avoid accrual of
avoidable damages to one not certain of his rights .... " E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A
Specialty Co., 88 F.2d 852, 854 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 680 (1937).
" "There is a general rule against splitting a cause of action. . . . And to ask for a
declaration for the breach of a contract, and in a subsequent proceeding asking for damages,
would seem to violate the spirit of that rule .... " Beatty v. Chicago B. & Q. R. R., 49 Wyo.
22, 38, 52 P.2d 404, 409 (1935) (an action for damages was available, however, at time
declaratory suit was brought).
0' For example, in a subsidy contract operating between the years 1970 and 1980, if the annual
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therefore, to be an unnecessary and shortsighted action. To mitigate
this seemingly harsh position the court might hold that the statute of
limitations should run separately for money and declaratory relief
actions, depending on when the right to each originally accrues. The
trend, however, is to permit suits for declaratory judgments until the
right to coercive relief has itself been extinguished." This does not
contravene the statute's policy of preventing unfair surprise, because
the possibility of declaratory relief would not subject the Government
to undue uncertainty so long as a money-judgment action is
available.'"" For these reasons, the wiser view is that the availability of
declaratory relief in the Court of Claims should not affect the running
of the statute of limitations.' 0
CONCLUSION
Whether the court's remedial powers will ever be expanded beyond
the express limits of King is merely speculative, but a reasonable
contention can be made that it should. While recognizing that
"further relief" ancillary to a declaratory decree is expressly
authorized by the Declaratory Judgment Act,"' the court left
undecided the question of whether specific relief, such as an
injunction, could be rendered subsequent to a dishonored declaratory
judgment. The expansion of the court's subject-matter jurisdiction
would not be involved, because the original claim for declaratory
relief would have to be in pursuit of a money judgment. Since the
statute on its face permits such coercive relief in order to render
effective a court's decrees, the reasoning in King supports the
availability of such supplemental relief. Nor would this run counter to
the court's present policy of granting not only money judgments but,
in addition, "any incidental relief in equity in aid of such a
judgment."' 12 For instance, it has been held that it is within a court's
accounting for the first year were completed in 1972, a ship operator would have to bring suit for
money or declaratory relief prior to 1978 to avoid barring his cause of action, even though he
might prefer to bring a single action on the entire contract after the final accounting in 1980 or
thereafter.
1OS See note 104 supra.
'C' See C. PRESTON & G. NEWSOM, LIMITATION OF AcTIoNs (1943).
"'See generally Comment, Mandatory Administrative Proceedings and Statutes of
Limitations in Government Contract Cases: A Three- Way Conjlict, 53 VA. L. REv. 150(1967);
Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177 (1950).
28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1964). "Further relief" means coercieve relief. BORCHARD 441.
" Blanc v. United States, 244 F.2d 708, 709 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 874 (1957).
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jurisdictional powers to reform a contract and enter a money
judgment on the contract as reformed. '3 On the other hand, it would
conflict with the judicial hesitancy, as noted in King and Jones, of
directly coercing public officials. Perhaps it could be argued that such
relief requires express congressional approval in both statutory lan-
guage and legislative history of the Act. The decision on this issue
may, then, hinge on the Court's attitude toward the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, and this, in turn, shotld prove enlightening as to
the strength and viability of this frequently excoriated doctrine."4
'See Cramp & Sons v. United States, 239 U.S. 221 (1915); United States v. Milliken
Imprinting Co., 202 U.S. 168 (1906).
"' In 1967, a bill was introduced in Congress which would confer some equity jurisdiction
upon the Court of Claims by authorizing it to implement its judgments for compensation of
claims against the United States. See S. 1704, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
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